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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jerry Reeves was convicted of robbery, carrying a 
firearm without a license, and second degree murder relating 
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to an armed robbery of a gas station convenience store that 
resulted in the death of the store clerk.  Reeves was sentenced 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  He filed 
a four-months-late habeas petition in federal court asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to excuse his 
petition’s untimeliness based on the actual innocence 
exception to procedural default recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298 (1995), and extended to include time-barred 
petitions in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).  To 
qualify for this exception, the petitioner must present new, 
reliable evidence showing it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have voted to convict him.  Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 324, 329.  Because we conclude that Reeves has 
identified evidence that may show actual innocence that was 
not presented to the jury, we will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings.   
 
I 
 
On May 25, 2006, a man robbed a City Gas and Diesel 
convenience store in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and shot and 
killed the store’s clerk.  The robbery and shooting were 
captured on the store’s silent, black-and-white surveillance 
video.  The video shows that a single robber entered the store 
and pointed a gun at the clerk.  The clerk tried to close a 
bulletproof glass window, but the robber’s arm blocked the 
window from closing.  The robber fired a shot, causing the 
clerk to fall back.  The clerk got up, made a surrendering 
gesture, and began emptying the cash register.  The clerk then 
fell to the floor, and the robber jumped over the counter 
through the open bulletproof glass window and collected the 
remaining money.  He then left the store on foot.  A local 
newspaper published a story about the crime the next day.  
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A few days after the shooting, Reeves, then eighteen 
years old, was in jail for conduct unrelated to the robbery.  A 
police officer asked him about the convenience store robbery 
and Reeves claimed that he had witnessed the crime and 
identified a robber by name.  Reeves was subsequently 
released and attended his family’s Memorial Day cookout a 
few days later.  On May 30, 2006, the police interviewed 
Reeves, who ultimately admitted that he had lied about 
witnessing the robbery to gain release and attend his family’s 
cookout.  He was charged with and pleaded guilty to hindering 
apprehension.  
 
Around this time, the police had received information 
about other potential suspects.  The same day the robbery 
occurred, the police were notified that two individuals who had 
previously been convicted of other crimes—Kai Anderson and 
Michael Holmes—failed to show up at a work-release center 
located near the City Gas and Diesel and that Anderson fit the 
physical description of the robber.  On May 29, 2006, the 
police spoke to Danielle Ignazzito—the mother of Anderson’s 
child—who stated that Anderson called her two days after the 
robbery, telling her he had “a lot of money” to give her for 
outstanding child support.  App. 155.  She further stated that 
she received a call from Kenneth Marlow, who told her that 
Anderson and Holmes had fled the state because police were 
looking for Anderson for the robbery.  On May 31, 2006, 
Anderson was arrested and admitted escaping the work release 
center with Holmes, talking to Marlow, and asking Marlow to 
call Ignazzito.  Anderson claimed that a different person 
committed the robbery.  
On June 9, 2006, the police interviewed Marlow.  
Marlow stated that Anderson told him that he was involved in 
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the robbery and asked Marlow to call Ignazzito for him.  A few 
weeks later, Johnathan Johnston—who had been incarcerated 
with Anderson—told the police that Anderson confessed to 
him that he participated in the robbery with Holmes and 
Holmes’s younger brother to obtain money to repay a victim 
of another robbery Anderson committed.  According to 
Johnston, Anderson provided specific details about the 
robbery, including that the robber was not supposed to shoot 
the clerk but that the gun went off, and the clerk fell, got up, 
then fell again, at which point the robber jumped over the 
counter to retrieve the money.  Johnston also stated that 
Anderson wanted Johnston’s wife to threaten Ignazzito so that 
she would not talk to the police.  Johnston further told the 
police that Anderson said he had also confessed to Marlow and 
that Marlow was not supposed to tell Ignazzito about the 
robbery.  On March 9, 2007, the police interviewed Michael 
Holmes, who admitted to leaving the work release center with 
Anderson on the day of the robbery but spent the day visiting 
various people’s homes.  The record does not indicate why the 
Anderson leads were not pursued further, but before trial, 
Reeves’s trial counsel was provided with copies of the police 
reports about Anderson and Holmes.      
 
On July 29, 2009, more than three years after the 
shooting, Reeves and his then-girlfriend, who was pregnant, 
were arrested and taken to jail for conduct unrelated to the City 
Gas and Diesel robbery.  Reeves again spoke to police officers 
and, ten to twelve hours later, confessed to committing the City 
Gas and Diesel robbery.   
 
At Reeves’s trial in 2010, the prosecutor presented the 
testimony of the officers who had interviewed Reeves, an 
audio recording of Reeves’s confession, and the store 
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surveillance tape of the robbery and shooting, among other 
evidence.  Reeves testified and denied involvement in the 
robbery, stating that he was experiencing health problems on 
the day of his July 29, 2009 confession and that detectives told 
him they would take him to the hospital only if he confessed.  
He also asserted that detectives promised to release his 
girlfriend if he confessed and that the police fed him details 
about the robbery for his taped confession.  Reeves further 
stated that he was in Baltimore at the time of the crime, which 
caused the prosecution to call a rebuttal witness who testified 
that while he was in jail with Reeves, Reeves discussed paying 
a person to say that Reeves was in Baltimore, not Harrisburg, 
when the robbery occurred.  The Kai Anderson evidence was 
not presented at trial. 
 
The jury convicted Reeves of robbery, carrying a 
firearm without a license, and second degree murder.  He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on July 1, 2011, 
and Reeves did not appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
   
On July 30, 2012, Reeves filed a Post-Conviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”) petition asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to present the Kai 
Anderson evidence, among other alleged deficiencies.  On 
October 10, 2012, the PCRA Court issued a memorandum 
order notifying Reeves of its intent to dismiss the PCRA 
petition.  Reeves filed objections on October 29, 2012, and the 
PCRA Court dismissed the petition on November 26, 2012 
without a hearing, concluding that trial counsel’s failure to 
present evidence of an alternate suspect did not prejudice 
Reeves because Reeves confessed to committing the robbery 
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and the store surveillance video corroborated his confession.1  
On November 7, 2013, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
summarily affirmed and adopted the PCRA Court’s October 
10, 2012 and November 26, 2012 opinions without additional 
reasoning.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Reeves’s 
petition for review.   
 
On July 31, 2014, Reeves filed a federal habeas petition 
with new counsel, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the grounds that Reeves’s trial counsel failed to investigate 
and present certain exculpatory evidence at trial, including 
evidence suggesting that Anderson and Holmes committed the 
robbery.2  Reeves conceded that his federal habeas petition was 
filed approximately four months late, but asserted that this 
                                                                
1 In its discussion concerning the Kai Anderson 
evidence, the PCRA Court stated: “Accepting Petitioner’s 
argument that all of the hearsay and non-hearsay testimony that 
would have been presented at trial would have been 
admissible, Petitioner fails to explain how this testimony 
would have rebutted Petitioner’s own admission to the 
robbery/homicide.”  App. 492.   
2 Besides the evidence concerning other alternative 
suspects, Reeves pointed to trial counsel’s failures to 
adequately develop and/or present (1) evidence of Reeves’s 
left-handedness and the shooter’s right-handedness, (2) 
inconsistencies between Reeves’s confession and the 
surveillance video, (3) a news article of the robbery which 
would show that Reeves’s confession contained public 
information about the crime, (4) medical records showing 
Reeves was hospitalized on the day of his confession for a 
suicide attempt and had a history of mental health problems, 
and (5) evidence of Reeves’s history of uncontrolled lying.     
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procedural defect was excusable because he had shown actual 
innocence.  The petition was referred to the Magistrate Judge 
for a report and recommendation.  The Magistrate Judge 
opined that the actual innocence exception requires the 
petitioner to present new evidence and that the evidence 
Reeves claims should have been presented was available to 
him and his trial counsel and thus did not qualify as new 
evidence.  As a result, the Magistrate Judge denied an 
evidentiary hearing and recommended that the District Court 
dismiss Reeves’s petition as untimely.  The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, 
agreed that the evidence concerning alternative suspects was 
not new evidence because it was available at trial, concluded 
that Reeves failed to demonstrate actual innocence sufficient 
to overcome the statute of limitations, and dismissed Reeves’s 
petition as time-barred.  The District Court also denied an 
evidentiary hearing and a certificate of appealability.  Reeves 
sought a certificate of appealability, which we granted as to, 
among other things, “(1) whether the evidence Appellant relied 
on in the District Court constitutes ‘new’ evidence” and “(2) 
whether Appellant’s evidence satisfied the [actual innocence] 
standard.”  App. 72-73.  
 
 
 
 
 
II3 
                                                                
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254.  Our Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review is plenary where, as here, the 
District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.  Houck 
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Reeves asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present at trial evidence of alternative suspects for the 
shooting, his left-handedness, mental condition at the time of 
his confession, and history of compulsive lying.  He concedes 
that his petition is late but argues that this exculpatory evidence 
demonstrates actual innocence and warrants excusing his 
untimeliness.  
 
A 
 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), state prisoners have one year to file 
a federal habeas petition, which begins to run from “the date 
on which the judgment became final.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A).  However, to prevent a “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice,” an untimely petition is not barred when 
a petitioner makes a “credible showing of actual innocence,” 
which provides a gateway to federal review of the petitioner’s 
otherwise procedurally barred claim of a constitutional 
violation.4  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 392.  This 
                                                                
v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2010).  In addition, we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s determination 
of a petitioner’s claim of actual innocence.  Sweger v. Chesney, 
294 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002).   
4 In contrast to gateway (or procedural) actual innocence 
claims, freestanding (or substantive) claims of actual 
innocence assert innocence without any accompanying 
constitutional defect in the trial resulting in the conviction.  See 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 313-16 (distinguishing between the two 
types of claims).  The Supreme Court has not definitively 
resolved whether such freestanding actual innocence claims 
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“exception[] is grounded in the ‘equitable discretion’ of habeas 
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in 
the incarceration of innocent persons,” and it “survived 
AEDPA’s passage.”5  Id. at 392-93.  In this context, actual 
innocence refers to factual innocence, not legal insufficiency.  
                                                                
are cognizable, McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392, but to the extent 
they are, they are assessed under a more demanding standard, 
since the petitioner’s claim is that his conviction is 
constitutionally impermissible “even if his conviction was the 
product of a fair trial,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.  See House v. 
Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (concluding that the petition 
satisfied the gateway innocence standard announced in Schlup 
but not the higher standard for freestanding innocence 
discussed in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)).  
Gateway innocence claims, on the other hand, assert a claim of 
actual innocence “so strong that a court cannot have confidence 
in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that 
the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.”  Schlup, 
513 U.S. at 316.  
5 Although AEDPA explicitly provides actual 
innocence exceptions to some of its procedural provisions, and 
these exceptions incorporate a newly discovered evidence 
standard, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2), the 
Supreme Court has explained that the actual innocence 
miscarriage of justice exception is separate from AEDPA’s 
statutory provisions, and the exception survived AEDPA’s 
passage.  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 393-98.  Thus, AEDPA’s 
actual innocence provisions are not dispositive of the scope of 
new evidence under the actual innocence miscarriage of justice 
exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Schlup, House, 
and McQuiggin.  
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Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted).  
 
To satisfy this standard, first, “a petitioner must present 
new, reliable evidence” and second, “show by a preponderance 
of the evidence ‘that it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 
new evidence,’” Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing and quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327), or 
stated differently, that it is “more likely than not any reasonable 
juror would have reasonable doubt,” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 
518, 538 (2006).  As part of the reliability assessment of the 
first step, the court “may consider how the timing of [the 
petitioner’s] submission and the likely credibility of the 
[witnesses] bear on the probable reliability of that evidence,” 
as well as the circumstances surrounding the evidence and any 
supporting corroboration.  Id. at 537, 551 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); see also McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 
399.   
 
In evaluating the second step—whether it is more likely 
than not no reasonable juror would convict the petitioner—the 
court “must consider all the evidence, old and new, 
incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it 
would necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that 
would govern at trial.”  House, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[M]ere impeachment 
evidence is generally not sufficient to satisfy the [actual 
innocence gateway] standard.”  Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 
F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012).  However, new, reliable evidence 
that “undermine[s] the [trial] evidence pointing to the identity 
of the [perpetrator] and the motive for the [crime]” can suffice 
to show actual innocence.  Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 
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233 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 336-37 
(explaining that actual innocence was demonstrated where new 
evidence both showed that the crime could not have happened 
in the way the Commonwealth presented at trial and provided 
an alternative theory that was more appropriate and better fit 
the facts of the case).  In weighing the evidence, “[t]he court’s 
function is not to make an independent factual determination 
about what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely 
impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors”; the actual 
innocence standard “does not require absolute certainty about 
the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.”  House, 547 U.S. at 538.   
 
The gateway actual innocence standard is “demanding” 
and satisfied only in the “rare” and “extraordinary” case where 
“a petition presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court 
cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the 
court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 
constitutional error.”  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 392, 401 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 
B 
 
The threshold requirement for applying the actual 
innocence standard is new evidence supporting the petitioner’s 
innocence.  The Supreme Court opinions addressing the actual 
innocence gateway do not explicitly define “new evidence,” 
and our sister circuit courts are split on whether the evidence 
must be newly discovered or whether it is sufficient that the 
evidence was not presented to the fact-finder at trial.  The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—the first to address the 
issue—held that “evidence is new only if it was not available 
at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 
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1023, 1028 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Thereafter, the Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits concluded otherwise: petitioners 
can satisfy the actual innocence standard’s new evidence 
requirement by offering “newly presented” exculpatory 
evidence, meaning evidence not presented to the jury at trial.  
See Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2003).  More 
recently, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Sixth 
Circuits have similarly suggested that actual innocence can be 
shown by relying on newly presented—not just newly 
discovered—evidence of innocence.  See Riva v. Ficco, 803 
F.3d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 2015); Cleveland v. Bradshaw, 693 F.3d 
626, 633 (6th Cir. 2012); Rivas v. Fisher, 687 F.3d 514, 543, 
546-47 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has acknowledged but not weighed in on the circuit 
split.6  Fratta v. Davis, 889 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2018); see 
also Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1018 
                                                                
6 Recent Fifth Circuit decisions, however, have included 
language arguably suggesting an inclination toward a newly 
discovered standard.  See Fratta, 889 F.3d at 232 n.21 (citing 
Moore v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454, 465 (5th Cir. 2008), with 
a parenthetical stating that “evidence was not ‘new’ where ‘it 
was always within the reach of [petitioner’s] personal 
knowledge or reasonable investigation”); Floyd v. Vannoy, __ 
F.3d __, No. 17-30421, 2018 WL 3115935, at *7-9 (5th Cir. 
June 25, 2018) (using the phrase “newly-discovered evidence” 
in discussing fingerprint comparison evidence that existed at 
the time of trial but was neither known to the petitioner nor 
presented at trial, and holding that the evidence met the Schlup 
standard). 
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n.21 (11th Cir. 2012) (refraining from reaching issue of whether 
petitioner’s evidence that was available at trial but was not  
presented should be considered “new” for purposes of Schlup).   
     
  Those courts that define “new evidence” to include 
evidence not presented at trial find support in Schlup.  In 
announcing the standard for a gateway actual innocence claim, 
the Schlup Court stated that a federal habeas court, after being 
presented with new, reliable exculpatory evidence, must then 
weigh “all of the evidence, including . . . evidence tenably 
claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become 
available only after the trial” to determine whether no 
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty.  513 
U.S. at 327-28.  The reference to “wrongly excluded” evidence 
suggests that the assessment of an actual innocence claim is not 
intended to be strictly limited to newly discovered evidence—
at least not in the context of reaching an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to investigate or 
present at trial such exculpatory evidence, as was the case in 
Schlup.  In addition, in articulating the new, reliable evidence 
requirement, the Supreme Court stated that the petitioner must 
“support his allegations of constitutional error with new 
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific 
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 
evidence—that was not presented at trial.”7  Id. at 324.  
Moreover, the Court used the phrase “newly presented 
evidence” in the context of discussing witness credibility 
assessments that may occur as part of the actual innocence 
gateway analysis.  Id. at 330.  When considered in the context 
                                                                
7 Post-Schlup, the Supreme Court clarified that credible, 
actual innocence evidence was not limited to these three types 
of evidence.  House, 547 U.S. at 537. 
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of the Court’s other statement about weighing all evidence—
including not only evidence unavailable at trial but also 
evidence excluded at trial—these references to evidence not 
presented at trial further suggest that new evidence, solely 
where counsel was ineffective for failing to discover or use 
such evidence, requires only that the evidence not be presented 
to the factfinder at trial.  Indeed, among the new evidence 
presented by the petitioner in Schlup was an affidavit 
containing witness statements that were available at trial, see 
id. at 310 n.21, but the Supreme Court did not discuss the 
significance of the evidence’s availability nor reject the 
evidence outright, which presumably it would have done if the 
actual innocence gateway was strictly limited to newly 
discovered evidence.  Schlup therefore strongly suggests that 
new evidence in the actual innocence context refers to newly 
presented exculpatory evidence.8  Indeed, in a subsequent 
                                                                
8 The Schlup opinion discussed above was written by 
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, while the four remaining justices 
dissented.  Justice O’Connor, in addition to joining Justice 
Stevens’s decision, also separately concurred, stating that she 
understood the majority to hold that a petitioner “‘must show 
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
have convicted him’ in light of newly discovered evidence of 
innocence.”  513 U.S. at 332 (citation omitted).  She then 
proceeded to state that the majority did not “decide whether the 
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary 
remedy.”  Id. at 333.  Had Justice O’Connor merely joined part 
of the majority opinion, her use of “newly discovered 
evidence” would have constituted Schlup’s holding.  See 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining 
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
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decision, the Supreme Court cited Schlup for this very 
proposition, stating that “‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual 
innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at 
trial.”  Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).9   
                                                                
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.”).  However, Justice O’Connor joined the 
majority opinion, and her separate discussion of the actual 
innocence gateway test reflects agreement with that standard, 
not any desire to narrow the majority’s construction of it.  Nor 
did Justice O’Connor discuss any problems with the majority’s 
reasoning in support of the test or note any distinction between 
newly presented and newly discovered evidence.  Under these 
circumstances, the fairest reading of Schlup is that the test 
articulated by the majority opinion and its reference to 
evidence not presented (at least in the context of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim) was indeed supported by a 
majority of the justices, and therefore binding.  Moreover, 
subsequently in Calderon, Justice O’Connor joined the 
majority opinion without writing separately, and the majority 
cited Schlup for the assertion that “a claim of actual innocence 
must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial” in 
order to be credible.  Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 
(1998).  
9 The Calderon dissenters also stated that “as the Court 
realizes, our standard dealing with innocence of an underlying 
offense requires no clear and convincing proof . . . and the 
Court would be satisfied with a demonstration of innocence by 
evidence not presented at trial, even if it had been discovered, 
let alone discoverable but unknown, that far back.”  523 U.S. 
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Our Court has not yet resolved the meaning of new 
evidence in the actual innocence context.  In dicta, we have 
suggested that new evidence generally must be newly 
discovered, while at the same time recognizing an exception 
may exist when a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on counsel’s failure to discover the very 
exculpatory evidence on which the petitioner relies to 
demonstrate his actual innocence.  See Houck, 625 F.3d at 94-
95 (stating that the Court was “inclined to accept the [Eight 
Circuit’s] Amrine definition of new evidence with the narrow 
limitation that if the evidence was not discovered for use at trial 
because trial counsel was ineffective, the evidence may be 
regarded as new provided that it is the very evidence that the 
petitioner claims demonstrates his innocence” but deciding to 
“stop short of applying a modified Amrine standard” and 
instead “assum[ing] without deciding” that the petitioner’s 
evidence constituted new evidence).  This limited exception 
avoids an inequity that could lead to the “injustice of 
incarcerating an innocent individual.”  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 
393.  Such an inequity could occur under the following 
circumstances: say that a petitioner was convicted of a murder, 
and the prosecutor had withheld a videotape depicting a 
different person committing the crime.  Further assume the 
tape was not revealed until years after the trial.  That petitioner 
could invoke the actual innocence gateway to pursue this 
Brady due process claim because the evidence was newly 
discovered.  Now, assume the same videotape was produced to 
trial counsel and was available for use at trial, but counsel did 
not present it to the jury.  Under Amrine, that petitioner would 
be forced to concede that the evidence was not new because it 
                                                                
at 573 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
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was available at trial, and he would be foreclosed from seeking 
relief under the actual innocence gateway.  In contrast, in the 
former scenario, the same evidence, which existed but was 
unknown to the petitioner, would be deemed new evidence that 
could support the actual innocence gateway.   
 
As the Gomez court stated, “in a case where the 
underlying constitutional violation claimed is ineffective 
assistance of counsel premised on a failure to present [such] 
evidence, a requirement that the new evidence be unknown to 
the defense at the time of trial would operate as a roadblock to 
the actual innocence gateway.”  350 F.3d at 679-80.  To 
overcome this roadblock, we now hold that when a petitioner 
asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s 
failure to discover or present to the fact-finder the very 
exculpatory evidence that demonstrates his actual innocence, 
such evidence constitutes new evidence for purposes of the 
Schlup actual innocence gateway. 
 
The approach we adopt is consistent with Schlup and 
the rulings of many of our sister circuits.  Moreover, it 
recognizes that “the injustice that results from the conviction 
of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal 
justice system.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325.  Indeed, “the 
conviction of an innocent person [is] perhaps the most grievous 
mistake our judicial system can commit,” and thus, the 
contours of the actual innocence gateway must be determined 
with consideration for correcting “such an affront to liberty.”  
Satterfield v. Dist. Att’y Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 
2017).  The limited approach we adopt to evaluate new 
evidence to support an actual innocence gateway claim, where 
that claim is made in pursuit of an underlying claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) ensures that reliable, 
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compelling evidence of innocence will not be rejected on the 
basis that it should have been discovered or presented by 
counsel when the very constitutional violation asserted is that 
counsel failed to take appropriate actions with respect to that 
specific evidence; and (2) is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s command that a petitioner will pass through the actual 
innocence gateway only in rare and extraordinary cases.  
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.10    
 
C 
 
Here, the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation and the District Court’s decision adopting 
that report both understandably concluded that exculpatory 
evidence available to, but not presented by, Reeves’s trial 
counsel—such as the evidence concerning alternative 
suspects—was not new evidence for purposes of the actual 
innocence gateway.11  They therefore did not proceed to 
                                                                
10 The Eighth Circuit’s approach in Amrine and the 
Fifth Circuit’s seemingly contrary approach in Floyd and 
Fratta are unpersuasive, as those courts provided no reasoning 
to support their narrower constructions of “new evidence.”  
 11 The Magistrate Judge relied on three Third Circuit 
opinions, Hubbard, Goldblum, and Sistrunk, as support for this 
conclusion that exculpatory evidence available to trial counsel 
but which counsel failed to present at trial did not constitute 
new evidence.  However, “[t]he ‘new’ evidence Hubbard puts 
forth in alleging actual innocence is nothing more than a 
repackaging of the record as presented at trial.”  Hubbard v. 
Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2004).  As the Magistrate 
Judge acknowledged, we assumed for purposes of the appeal 
in Goldblum that the pathologist’s report was new, reliable 
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determine the reliability of the evidence or consider whether 
such evidence, assessed with all the rest of the evidence 
adduced at trial, would more likely than not convince any 
reasonable juror not to convict Reeves.  In light of their view 
that Reeves failed to satisfy the actual innocence gateway 
standard, they also did not reach the merits of Reeves’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Because we hold that 
under the circumstances presented here, the Kai Anderson 
evidence is “new,” given that it was known but not presented 
allegedly due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance, we will 
vacate the District Court’s order and remand.  If on remand the 
District Court concludes that this new evidence is reliable, then 
it should proceed to undertake a holistic assessment of the new, 
reliable evidence and the evidence presented at trial to 
determine whether Reeves has shown it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.  If Reeves 
makes this showing, then the District Court should review his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits under the 
applicable AEDPA standard of review.   
 
 
 
III 
 For the reasons above, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
                                                                
evidence, Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 226.  Finally, Sistrunk did not 
characterize the petitioner’s federal habeas claims as based on 
the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel who failed to 
discover or present to the fact-finder the exculpatory evidence 
demonstrating his actual innocence.  See Sistrunk, 674 F.3d at 
185-87.  
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Reeves v. Superintendent SCI Fayette, No. 17-1043 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
I agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that evidence 
defense counsel was aware of, but failed to present, can 
satisfy the new evidence requirement of Schlup v. Delo.1 
However, I write separately to emphasize the weight of the 
evidence that supports Reeves’s claim of actual innocence, 
and the questionable nature of the investigation that resulted 
in the conviction of someone who may well have languished 
in a prison cell for eight years for a murder that was most 
probably committed by someone else.   
 
The circumstances leading to Reeves’s conviction are 
summarized in my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion along with 
much of the evidence that supports his claim of actual 
innocence.  Indeed, the case in support of Reeves’s claim of 
actual innocence is so substantial that a group consisting of 
retired federal judges, former federal prosecutors, and a 
former member of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General’s Office, has filed an amicus brief on his behalf.2  
Yet, as I shall discuss, for some inexplicable reason, police 
simply refused to follow even the most obvious leads that did 
not confirm their suspicion that Reeves was the killer.  They 
did eventually obtain a confession from Reeves.  However, 
given the totality of the circumstances here, that confession 
does not negate his claim of actual innocence.  
 
I. 
 
Shortly after the May 25th, 2006 robbery of the City 
Gas & Diesel described in the majority opinion, Jerry Reeves, 
who was then just eighteen years old, was arrested at a city 
park in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  He was not arrested 
because police suspected him of being involved in the fatal 
robbery of City Gas & Diesel.  Rather, he was arrested for 
throwing a rock onto a miniature golf course and hitting 
someone in the leg.  While in his jail cell, Reeves was 
approached by Officer Derek Fenton.  Fenton did not 
                                              
1  513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). 
2 See Brief for Former Prosecutors, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Reeves 1. 
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approach Reeves based on any suspicion that Reeves was 
involved in the fatal shooting.  Rather, Fenton fancied himself 
a bit of a sleuth and prided himself on his ability to ferret out 
information.  He testified that he went to Reeves in his jail 
cell because he, Fenton, believed himself to have “an 
excellent rapport with our detective division for the 
intelligence [he was] able to gather.”3  In Fenton’s words, he 
approached Reeves because: “You don’t know until you try 
and anyone you encounter on the street, you just strike them a 
conversation.”4   Reeves, who had been adopted out of foster 
care, and had a history of lying, was eager to get out of jail 
and go home for a family cookout the next day.  Thus, 
Fenton’s instincts appeared to pay off. 
 
Reeves told Officer Fenton that he had witnessed the 
robbery from across the street.  He even identified the robber.  
Reeves told Fenton that the robber was a man named 
Jermaine Taylor, who was six feet tall with brown skin.  
Reeves would later testify at his trial that that was a lie.  The 
police had apparently told Reeves that if he “had info they 
would let [him] out,” and Reeves wanted to be released so he 
could get home in time for the aforementioned cookout.5  He 
testified: “I ha[d] not seen my family in a while, so I wanted 
to see them.” “That is why I lied.”6  As promised, the police 
released him after the conversation with Officer Fenton and 
he attended his family’s cookout.     
 
In the meantime, a “very excited” Officer Fenton 
notified the detective bureau.7  Fenton told Detective 
Christopher Krokos, the lead detective on the City Gas & 
Diesel homicide, about Reeves’s story.  Krokos 
understandably followed up by contacting Reeves who agreed 
to come to the police station to be interviewed on May 30th, 
five days after the robbery.  Once more, Reeves repeated that 
a six-foot-tall, brown-skinned, Black male named Jermaine 
Taylor had been the robber.  This time he added a detail that 
police knew was not true.  Even though the surveillance video 
                                              
3 App. 307. 
4 Id. at 306. 
5 Id. at 318. 
6 Id. at 318. 
7 Id. at 307-08. 
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depicted the shooter leaving the scene alone and on foot, 
Reeves stated that he had seen the robber run out of the store 
and get into a dark-colored Buick with lightly tinted windows 
and three other passengers.   
 
Detective Krokos would later write in his daily report 
that Reeves’s adoptive father, Terrie Reeves, had informed 
the detective that Reeves had admitted to lying about 
witnessing the robbery.  Krokos also noted in his report that 
Reeves’s father had cautioned Reeves not to lie again to the 
police.8   
 
Nevertheless, at this point, Krokos confronted Reeves 
about his untruthfulness.  Reeves then revised his story and 
said that he had heard the shooting but had not actually seen 
it.  To make things worse for Reeves, he admitted that 
Jermaine Taylor, the man he claimed had been the robber, 
“was someone he made up,” and that “none of the 
information he gave [Krokos] was true.”  Reeves’s admission 
that he had been lying clearly gave police reason to suspect 
that he might have been involved.  As a result of that 
admission, Reeves was charged with hindering apprehension, 
and the investigation continued.   
 
Police had already received a number of leads pointing 
in a different direction that should have, at the very least, 
cautioned against myopically focusing on Reeves.  The very 
same day of the robbery, staff at the county work-release 
center in Harrisburg had informed police that two work-
release clients—Kai Anderson and Michael Holmes—had 
escaped the night of the robbery.  Anderson fit the description 
of the robbery suspect, and the work-release staff told police 
that it was “very coincidental” that Anderson and Holmes 
escaped the same night the robbery occurred. The work-
release staff also provided police with photos and information 
about Anderson to aid in pursuing him.   
                                              
8 Officer Fenton, Detective Krokos and Terrie 
Reeves were not the only individuals to have 
witnessed Reeves lying.  His foster care reports 
described him as “deliberately untruthful” as a child 
and “often untruthful . . . to avoid what would be 
minimal consequences.”  
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Next, Kimberly Clark, the grandmother of Anderson’s 
child, had independently called police to tell them that 
Anderson had been making minute-long calls to her daughter, 
Danielle Ignazzito, several times a day and had been “act[ing] 
mysterious[ly].”9  Clark also reported that Anderson had told 
Ignazzito that “he’s on the run and or is wanted.”10   
 
Then came a third tip about Anderson.  Ignazzito, 
Clark’s daughter and the mother of Anderson’s son, had 
initially been “afraid” to give police information about 
Anderson’s whereabouts.11  But on May 29th, just four days 
after the robbery, Ignazzito told police that Anderson had 
called her several times to say that he had a lot of money to 
give her for their child.  Ignazzito said she had also spoken to 
Kenneth Marlow, a friend of Anderson’s.  Marlow told her 
that Anderson was in trouble, that Anderson had fled to Ohio 
with Michael Holmes (who had escaped from the work-
release center with Anderson), and that Anderson was being 
sought by police in connection with the City Gas & Diesel 
homicide.   
 
Six days after the robbery, police arrested Anderson 
for escaping from the work-release center.  Detective Krokos 
took the opportunity to interview Anderson, just as he had 
interviewed Reeves a few days earlier.  The interview was 
unfruitful.  Anderson confirmed that he had escaped from the 
work-release center but denied any involvement in the 
robbery.  He did, however, confirm that he had asked Marlow 
to call Ignazzito, just as Ignazzito had told Krokos.  Yet it is 
not clear if he also confirmed that he had expressed concern 
about being connected to the robbery, as Ignazzito had 
reported.  Anderson did admit that he had been “in the area of 
Linden St[.] and Walnut St.”—just a few blocks away from 
the City Gas & Diesel—on the night of the robbery.12  He 
also said that he had encountered the real robber there and 
actually heard that person confess to the crime.  Despite  
information placing him near the crime scene, and the three 
                                              
9 App. 137. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 159. 
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independent tips at least suggesting that further investigation 
into Anderson was warranted, it does not appear that 
suspicion ever turned from Reeves to Anderson (or to anyone 
else).  
 
Then came a fourth tip.  A week after interviewing 
Anderson, Detective Krokos interviewed Marlow.  Marlow 
admitted calling Ignazzito on Anderson’s behalf, as Ignazzito 
had reported, and to telling Ignazzito that Anderson was on 
the run.  Marlow also said that Anderson was “involved in the 
robbery/homicide at the City Gas & Diesel on State St.”13 
Marlow even told Krokos that he heard Anderson admit his 
involvement.  According to Marlow, Anderson had said that 
he (Anderson) “got a gun[,] went to the gas station[,] and shot 
the dude and robbed him.”14   
 
Thus, Detective Krokos now had information 
implicating Anderson from not two, not three, but four 
sources—the work-release center staff, Clark, Ignazzito, and 
now Marlow.  Yet, for reasons that are not at all clear on this 
record, the investigation continued to focus on Reeves.  There 
is more. 
 
Approximately a month after the robbery, another 
witness, Johnathan Johnston, came forward.  Johnston and 
Anderson had known each other for over fifteen years and 
had reunited at Dauphin County Prison after Anderson’s 
arrest for escaping from the work-release center.  Johnston 
told Krokos that Anderson had admitted involvement in the 
City Gas & Diesel robbery while they were in the County 
Prison.  Johnston’s statement about Anderson’s confession 
should have been taken particularly seriously because, unlike 
the stories that Reeves gave Krokos, Anderson’s purported 
statements to Johnston included subtle details about the 
robbery, many of which were unknown to the public.15  
                                              
13 Id. at 165. 
14 Id. at 82. 
15 According to Johnston’s statement, Anderson 
said he was “show[n]” the surveillance tape of the 
robbery during his interview with police.  App. 93-94.  
The police report of Anderson’s interview does not 
confirm that claim, nor does it suggest that any such 
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Specifically, Johnston said that Anderson had told him that 
(1) the shooter needed to be small enough to fit through the 
gap in the bullet-proof glass window to get to the other side 
of the counter; (2) the shooter was wearing all black; and (3) 
the shooter left the store on foot heading west.  Johnston’s 
statements to Krokos contained other indicia of reliability: 
Johnston knew that Anderson had admitted his involvement 
to Marlow, and that Marlow had repeated Johnston’s 
inculpatory statement to Ignazzito.   
 
Johnston told Krokos something else that the detective 
inexplicably ignored.  According to Johnston, “[Anderson] 
knew he could beat [the evidence in the surveillance video] 
he just need somebody talk to [Ignazzito] so she can, don’t 
say nothing and get scared because the cops already tried to 
scare her.”16  Indeed, Johnston said that Anderson had also 
asked him (Johnston) to have his wife threaten Ignazzito not 
to give the police any more information about Anderson and 
the City Gas & Diesel homicide.  Finally, Johnston said that 
Anderson told him that after “the gun went off[,] the [clerk] 
fell then got back up and he fell again.”17  That detail was 
visible in surveillance videos of the crime, but had not been 
made public.  Again, for reasons that are not at all apparent 
                                                                                                     
viewing took place.  However, the police reports 
indicate that police also showed the video to Xavier 
Henry, who had been identified as one of the City Gas 
& Diesel customers on the night of the robbery.  Police 
did so in an attempt to identify Derrick Small, the only 
customer present in the City Gas & Diesel store when 
the robber entered.  There is nothing in the record to 
establish any similar reason for showing the video to 
Anderson, who, as far as we know, had no information 
to identify Small or any other customer.  Nor is it clear 
what portions of the video, if any, Anderson might 
have seen.  The video is divided into multiple parts 
with footage from differing cameras both inside and 
outside of the store.   
16 App. 94. 
17 Id. at 97. 
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on this record, Krokos failed to pursue Anderson as a suspect, 
and the investigation began to “stall.”18   
 
Despite information that directly implicated 
Anderson and despite the police learning that 
Anderson knew subtle details about the robbery, the 
investigation appears to have simply gone dormant for 
three years.  Then, serendipity unfortunately placed 
Reeves in Detective Krokos’s crosshairs yet again.  In 
July of 2009, Reeves, who was now twenty-one years 
old, had been arrested with his girlfriend after an 
incident at a bar.  Upon learning of Reeves’s arrest, 
and despite all of the evidence pointing toward 
Anderson, Krokos took the opportunity to speak with 
Reeves once more about the City Gas & Diesel 
robbery.  At his trial, Reeves testified that he agreed to 
be interviewed again because he wanted to keep his 
pregnant girlfriend—with whom he had been 
arrested—from going to prison and was told that the 
officers would “see what they could do” if he talked to 
them.19    
 
Reeves offered the same story about having witnessed 
the crime that he had given Krokos three years earlier.  
However, this time Reeves said that two men, not one, had 
robbed the store and that Reeves’s own cousin had stood 
outside as a lookout.  Again, Krokos pressed Reeves on his 
lack of truthfulness.  The video showed that only one man 
had robbed the store.  Reeves responded by changing his 
story yet again.  This time, he stated he was not actually 
across the street when he saw the shooting, but was in a 
parking lot near the payphone; that he spoke to his cousin 
about the imminent plan to rob the store; and that it was an 
unknown male who actually went inside.  The questioning 
continued until Reeves finally asked, “[W]hat if I was in the 
                                              
18 Krokos conducted an interview with Michael 
Holmes in March of 2007, some nine months after the 
crime, but Holmes admitted only that he and Anderson 
had left the work-release center before the homicide.  
Holmes denied having ever even been in the City Gas 
& Diesel.   
19 App. 387-88. 
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store when it happened then what[’]s that?”20  The police 
report states:  
 
Reeves was confronted with the fact 
that if other people are involved they may talk 
to us about the incident.  He was asked what 
[are Reeves’s cousin and the other individual 
Reeves named] going to say if asked about 
this incident?  Reeves stated that they will say 
that it was me who did it.  Reeves then began 
to become concerned that he would not see his 
unborn child if he told us what occurred.  
Reeves was further questioned. 
 
Reeves then began to visibly shake and tremble.  He 
began to cry.21  Then Reeves “confessed.”  He said that he 
robbed the store because he needed money; that he knew the 
people in the store because he used to sweep the floors for 
them; that he got a gun but that he did not know the make or 
caliber; and that he had been given the gun the same day by 
someone in Baltimore, Maryland.   
 
Reeves then provided details on the robbery, many of 
which were prompted by leading questions from Krokos and 
his team.  They posed questions to confirm that, like the 
robber in the video, Reeves had also jumped over the counter: 
Q.  . . .  Do you remember did you jump 
up or do anything in the store? 
A.  I think I jump behind the counter.22 
They asked questions to corroborate the fact that bullet-proof 
plastic separated the robber from the clerk: 
Q.  Okay what was separating customers 
from behind the register? 
A.  Glass[.] 
Q.  Was it glass or plastic or? 
                                              
20 Id. at 198. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 106. 
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A.  Probably bullet proof plastic or 
something.23  
They verified that Reeves’s gun matched the gun used:  
Q.  And describe the gun again what 
color was it? 
A.  All black[.] 
Q.  And it was a semi-automatic not a 
revolver. 
A.  Semi-automatic yes.24  
They asked Reeves to specify that he had acted alone: 
Q.  And just, just so we’re clear you 
were the only one involved in this there was 
nobody else involved in this incident? 
A.  No not at all.25 
And they repeatedly pressed Reeves on whether he had worn 
something to disguise his face, as the robber had done in the 
video: 
Q.  Okay so what are you wearing when 
you go in the store? 
A.  Black, black pants, black t-shirt.  
Q.  Are you wearing a mask?  Do you 
remember? 
A.  No I don’t remember if I had a mask 
on or not probably, probably did, no I didn’t 
have a mask on. 
Q.  You didn’t have a mask on? 
A.  No[.] 
A.  Did you have gloves? 
Q.  I think so, I think so probably.   
. . .  
                                              
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 108. 
25 App. 113. 
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Q.  Q.  Did [the store clerk] recognize 
you? 
A.  Most likely yes.  He seen me plenty 
of times before that so if I wasn’t wearing a 
mask yes. 
Q.  [S]o what you’re saying is you don’t 
remember whether or not you were wearing . . .  
A.  [INAUDIBLE] masks or gloves that 
night. 
Q.  Okay, those are the two things you 
don’t remember whether or not you were 
wearing that night. 
A.  Yes[.]   
Q.  Just for the tape I’m not sure it got ah 
on there clearly, you don’t remember if you 
were wearing a mask or gloves? 
A. No[.]26  
 
Despite obtaining what purported to be a confession, 
Krokos either ignored or did not credit some rather 
remarkable discrepancies between Reeves’s account and the 
actual facts of the robbery.  Reeves said that he struggled with 
the clerk before the shooting.  Yet the surveillance video 
shows that the clerk and the robber never even touched one 
another.27  Reeves said he ran towards Boas Street, which is 
north of the City Gas & Diesel, while the actual robber 
headed in a westerly direction, according to the surveillance 
video.  Reeves also said he did not remember if he had gotten 
anything from the store after firing the gun, though the real 
robber left with a bag full of money from the cash register.  
Finally, Reeves said the gun he used “looked like a []9” 
                                              
26 Id. at 105, 112. 
27 The clerk simply attempted to close the 
bullet-proof window separating the check-out counter 
from the customer area before the robber could point 
the gun through the window’s opening.   
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millimeter,28 which is the same caliber as a .357, but the 
actual gun used was a much smaller, .25 caliber.   
 
Most significantly, in the video, the shooter appears to 
be right-handed.  He removed the pistol from the front of his 
pants with his right hand then brandished it in his right hand.  
He switched the gun to his left hand only after the clerk had 
been shot and he needed his right hand to finish taking money 
from the register and from the floor.  Once he had collected 
the money, he used his right hand to jump back over the 
counter.  It is uncontested that Reeves is left-handed, and he 
has offered affidavits from people who knew him as a child to 
corroborate that.29  
 
Of course, police may not have noticed that Reeves 
was left-handed during the numerous times they interacted 
with him and it would have been understandable to simply 
assume, absent a reason to suspect otherwise, that he was 
right-handed.  This is particularly true in light of his 
confession and his prior interviews, which continuously 
resulted in what can only be described as false exculpatory 
statements.  
 
However, as I have already detailed, police had to 
ignore several leads to even get to the point of Reeves’s 
confession three years after the fatal robbery.  These leads 
included evidence that Anderson had admitted his 
involvement in the crime to two people; that he had suddenly 
come into a significant sum of money; that he had escaped 
from the work-release center on the night of the robbery; and 
that he had been in the vicinity of the robbery that night.  
Anderson had also tried to have someone threaten Ignazzito 
to keep her from saying anything more about his involvement 
in the robbery, and he had made statements revealing a detail 
about the robbery not known to the general public.  Yet, 
during the three-year lapse in this investigation, it does not 
                                              
28 Id. at 108. 
29 Reeves offered testimony at trial that he was 
left-handed, but his trial counsel never offered 
evidence to corroborate that fact.  Given his 
confession, the jury most likely simply discredited his 
uncorroborated testimony.  
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appear that police did anything to pursue the evidence of 
Anderson’s involvement before initiating the discussion with 
Reeves that ultimately led to the statement that resulted in his 
conviction for the fatal robbery.  Given this record, as I noted 
at the outset, Reeves’s apparent confession does not negate 
the claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence under Schlup v. Delo.30  
 
Reeves would not be the first person to have falsely 
confessed to a crime.31  According to the National Registry of 
Exonerations, roughly half of individuals who have been 
exonerated following murder convictions involving DNA 
evidence in the United States since 1989, made a false 
confession.32  In Pennsylvania, the rate of false confessions is 
                                              
30 513 U.S. at 324.  I do not suggest that 
evidence of actual innocence must always be as strong 
as we have on this record before relief is available 
under Schlup v. Delo.  Indeed, it can only be hoped 
that the kind of investigation that led to Reeves’s 
confession, despite the strong evidence of someone 
else’s guilt, will be exceedingly rare.  Although the bar 
set by Schlup is a high one, it should not be raised so 
high that it becomes impossible to clear it.  Nothing in 
Schlup leads me to conclude that the Court intended 
the interests of justice advanced by that case to be 
illusory in all but the most outrageous and extreme 
cases or that the accused must be able to prove actual 
innocence to a near mathematical certainty.  
31 During oral argument, counsel for Reeves 
was asked about the reported frequency of 
exonerations following false confessions.  He 
subsequently submitted a reply pursuant to Fed. R. 
App. P. 28(j).  See Appellant’s May 28, 2018 Rule 
28(j) Letter. 
32 Compare Murder Exonerations in the U.S., 
The National Registry of Exonerations, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (click 
“Murder” in “Crime” field; click “Present” button in 
the “DNA” field) with Murder Exonerations in U.S. 
with False Confessions, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
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comparable.  Nearly half of individuals who have been 
exonerated with DNA evidence following a conviction for 
murder in Pennsylvania had confessed to those murders.33    
                                                                                                     
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (click 
“Murder” in “Crime” field; click “Present” button in 
“False Confession” field; click “Present” button in the 
“DNA” field).  As of May 28, 2018, nationally, the 
Registry has recorded 195 individuals that were 
convicted of murder in cases involving DNA evidence 
and that have since been exonerated. Of those 
exonerees, 43 percent, or 84 individuals, gave false 
confessions.  These statistics were supplied by counsel 
in his May 28, 2018 Rule 28(j) letter.  See supra note 
8; Appellant’s May 28, 2018 Rule 28(j) Letter 1-2. 
33 Compare Murder Exonerations in 
Pennsylvania, The National Registry of Exonerations, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (click 
“Pennsylvania” on interactive map; click “Murder” in 
“Crime” field) with Murder Exonerations in 
Pennsylvania with False Confessions, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (click 
“Pennylvania” on interactive map; click “Murder” in 
“Crime” field; click “Present” button in “False 
Confession” field; click “Present” button in the 
“DNA” field).  The Registry has recorded 9 
individuals that were convicted of murder in 
Pennsylvania and have since been exonerated in cases 
that involved DNA evidence.  Of those exonerees, 44 
percent, or 4 individuals, gave false confessions.   
As Brandon L. Garrett writes, there is a “new 
awareness among scholars, legislators, courts, 
prosecutors, police departments, and the public that 
innocent people falsely confess, often due to 
psychological pressure placed upon them during police 
interrogations.”  Garrett, The Substance of False 
Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051, 1052-53 (2010).  
Reeves’s “trembl[ing],” tear-filled confession certainly 
bore the markings of such psychological distress.  
App. 198.  He even attempted suicide in his cell just 
prior to having given the confession.     
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In referring to this data, I do not, of course, suggest 
that police should have completely ignored Reeves’s 
confession.  Rather, I refer to it simply to underscore that 
Reeves’s confession does not negate his arguments under 
Schlup.  I have already noted that absent the detective’s 
inexplicable failure to pursue leads pointing to Anderson and 
the equally puzzling three-year gap in this investigation, there 
would have been no incriminating statement from Reeves. 
 
II. 
 
Reeves has now spent eight years in prison for this 
armed robbery and murder conviction, a fact that will 
hopefully inform the speed with which subsequent courts 
address his now likely procedurally-cognizable habeas claim.   
